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Carton: The Seniority System Exemption in Title VII: International Brothe

THE SENIORITY SYSTEM EXEMPTION IN TITLE VII:
INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF
TEAMSTERS v. UNITED STATES
The primary objective of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
19641 is to prohibit discrimination based on race, color, religion,

sex, or national origin by employers 2 and labor organizations. 3 One
provision of the title provides an exemption for seniority systems
meeting certain criteria. 4 Three years after the title's effective date,
the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia in Quarles v.
Philip Morris, Inc.,5 narrowly interpreted this exemption. 6 The
Quarles interpretation was accepted by a great majority of commentators and federal courts. 7 Last Term, however, the Supreme
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
2. Id. § 2000e-2(a) makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual ... because of such individual's race ...

or (2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's race.
Id.
3. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(c), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1970 & Supp. V
1975), forbids a union
(1) to exclude or to expel from its membership, or otherwise to discriminate
against, any individual because of his race . . . ; (2) to limit, segregate, or

classify or fail to refuse to refer for employment any individual, in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual or employment, opportunities or othervise adversely affect his status as an employee or as an
applicant for employment, because of such individual's race .

.

. ; or (3) to

cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an individual
in violation of this section.
id.
4. Id. § 703(h), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970). Section 703(h), which is the focus
of this commentary, provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an
unlawful practice for an employer to apply different standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges or employment pursuant to
a bona fide seniority ...

system ....

provided that such differences are not

the result of an intention to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin ....

id.
5. 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
6. See text accompanying notes 14-35 infra.
7. See note 36 infra and accompanying text. See also International Bhd. of
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 380 & n.5 (1977) (Marshall & Brennan, JJ.,
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Court in InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters v. United States8

rejected the rule. This note will detail the distinction between the
Quarles and Teamsters interpretations of the exemption and will
evaluate each in view of the legislative history, the language of the
section itself, and prior Supreme Court cases.
The employer in Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 9 a tobacco
manufacturer, divided his operations into four departments: (1)
green leaf stemmery; (2) prefabrication; (3) fabrication; and (4)

warehouse shipping and receiving. This employer had pursued a
discriminatory hiring and promotion policy. By the time this discrimination suit was brought, the employer had largely racially in-

tegrated the four once wholly segregated departments. However,
in the lower paying, less desirable departments of prefabrication
and stemmery, workers were still primarily black, and in the preferred departments of fabrication and warehouse shipping and receiving, workers were still primarily white.
Quarles, a minority employee in the prefabrication department, sought a transfer to the warehouse and receiving depart-

ment. Two methods of transfer were available: a limited quota
system for minorities10 and a simple letter of intent or desire to
transfer written by the employee. The latter method, which
Quarles rejected, subjected the employee to loss of the seniority

accumulated in the lower department upon transfer: Seniority
would be based on only the amount of time in the new department, rather than on the total number of years with the company.

Quarles argued that this de facto discrimination deprived him of
the opportunity to obtain a better position and higher pay and
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Blumrosen, Seniority and Equal
Employment Opportunity: A Glimmer of Hope, 23 RUTGERs L. REV. 268 (1969);
Cooper & Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under FairEmployment Laws: A General
Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARv. L. REV. 1598
(1969); Fine, Plant Seniority and Minority Employees: Title VII's Effect on Layoffs,
47 U. COLO. L. REV. 73 (1975); Gould, Seniority and the Black Worker: Reflections
on Quarles and Its Implications, 47 TEx. L. REV. 1039 (1969); Poplin, FairEmployment in a Depressed Economy: The Layoff Problem, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 177 (1975);
Ross, Reconciling Plant Seniority with Affirmative Action and Anti-Discrimination,
28 N.Y.U. CONF. LAB. 231 (1976)).
8. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
9. 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
10. While not labeled a quota nor resembling it in every facet, this method may
be considered a quota because it allowed the transfer of only four minority employees from the prefabrication department every six months, in contrast to the opportunities for transfer for a white employee. For a detailed discussion of the available
modes of transfer, see id. at 512-13.
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therefore violated title VII. 11 He brought suit against the union
because the collective bargaining agreement contained the seniority
system which incorporated the employer's promotion policies.12
Defendant union relied on the exemption for seniority systems in
title VII which excludes from the Act's proscriptions any classifications based on a "bona fide seniority.

. .

system . . . provided that

such differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate
3
because of race."'
FORMULATING THE

Quarles RULE

Writing for the Quarles court, Judge Butzner framed the issue
as "whether the restrictive departmental transfer and seniority provisions of the collective bargaining agreement are intentional, unlawful employment practices because they are superimposed on a
departmental structure that was organized on a racially segregated
basis."'14 The district court conducted a three-part analysis of the issue. It first balanced the respective rights and expectations of white
and minority employees. The legislative history indicates that the
Act is to have "prospective," not "retrospective," application. 15 The
11. Id. at 514. Quarles argued that, notwithstanding the absence of discriminatory language in the collective bargaining agreement, its effect was to limits his
seniority solely as a result of his race. Id. at 513-15. See also Could, Employment Security, Seniority and Race: The Role of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 13
How. L.J. 1 (1967).
12. For a case outlining the rationale for union responsibility and liability under
title VII, notwithstanding the seniority exemption, see Robinson v. Lorillard Corp.,
444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970) (This portion of the section is hereinafter referred to as the intent proviso).
14. Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505, 510 (E.D. Va. 1968).
15. Rachlin, Title VII: Limitations and Qualifications, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM.
L. REv. 473, 478 (1966). During Senate debate on H.R. 7152, which was to become
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Senators Clark and Case, the bipartisan captains of the
bill, issued the following frequently quoted memorandum:
Title VII would have no effect on established seniority rights. Its effect is
prospective and not retrospective. Thus, for example, if a business had been
discriminating in the past and as a result has an all-white working force,
when the title comes into effect the employer's obligation would be simply
to fill future vacancies on a nondiscriminatory basis. He would not be
obliged-or indeed, permitted-to fire whites in order to hire Negroes, or to
prefer Negroes for future vacancies, or, once Negroes are hired, to give them
special seniority rights at the expense of the white workers hired earlier.
Interpretative Memorandum of Title VII of H.R. 7152 Submitted Jointly by Senator
Joseph S. Clark and Senator Clifford P. Case, Floor Managers (April 8, 1964), reprinted in 110 CONG. REc. 7212, 7213 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Interpretative
Memorandum].
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Act was intended only to alter discriminatory conditions arising
in the future, while not disturbing the status quo. This intention
evolved from balancing the right of minorities to nondiscriminatory
employment against the right of white employees to maintain the
status quo. 16 Judge Butzner noted, however, that the interest of
nonminorities in their seniority status did not amount to a vested,
indefeasible right.1 "- Therefore, in applying a balancing test to
employee rights, white employees' seniority expectations were subject to modification by the legal rights of other workers, that is, the
minority employees' rights to nondiscriminatory employment.1
Where the seniority system restricted the minority employees'
freedom to transfer to a higher position only because of originally
discriminatory hiring, 19 the expectations of the nonminorities were
held noncontrolling.20
16. Although Judge Butzner did not use "balance test" terminology, he compared the importance of the interests. In addition, many commentators have noted
the absence of absolutes in the legislative history and language of the title and specifically, of § 703(h). See, e.g., Rachlin, supra note 15, at 479-82, where the author
states that Senator McClellan's attempt to insert "solely" into the phrase in § 703(h)
which reads "result of an intention to discriminate" was rejected. Instead, a mere
showing of mixed intentions suffices to remove the seniority system from the exemption of § 703(h). Mr. Rachlin also points out the language of the exemption which
restricts its protection to "bona fide" systems, id. at 480-81; though this term is not
clearly defined, its use must somehow limit the scope of the section. See also Note,
Title VII, Seniority Discrimination, and the Incumbent Negro, 80 HARV. L. REV.
1260 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Note, 80 HARV. L. REV.]:
Senator Dirksen never explained what his proviso [which later became
§ 703(h)] was intended to mean; Senator Humphrey felt that it clarified the
"present intent and effect" of Title VII without narrowing its application,
But, however one reads the Dirksen proviso, it does not seem possible to
interpret it as providing a blanket exemption for all differences in treatment
resulting from seniority arrangements set up before Title VII ....

The pro-

viso does not expressly refer to such preexisting systems, but to all "bona
fide" systems.... [Elven though a discriminatory system of this type might
be termed "bona fide," certain "differences" in treatment authorized by the
system will "result" from the discriminatory intention which entered into its
establishment. These differences must, therefore, fall outside the scope of
the Dirksen proviso's protection.
Id. at 1272-73 (footnotes omitted). Implementation of the statute, therefore, appears
subject to balancing the interests of the parties in each case. For an excellent discussion of the vagueness in the language and legislative history of § 703(h) and in the
title in general, and for the theory that any such ambiguity in the language of the
section was an intentional manifestation of the balancing test to be applied in seniority cases, see Gould, supra note 11, at 20-23.
17. See Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505, 520 (E.D. Va. 1968).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 517.
20. Id. at 520.
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Secondly, Judge Butzner found that the comments in the legislative history condemning a retrospective application of the Act
applied only to "bumping" 2 1 white employees to give minority
employees a job. He noted an important distinction between
bumping a white employee to give his job to a discriminatee and
allowing minorities to obtain future promotions on the basis of
number of years employed. 22 He further observed that by allowing
minority employees to transfer and retain company seniority commensurate with the number of years employed, no reverse discrimination 23 was perpetrated against the nonminorities. No white
employee was being bumped, as might have occurred if plaintiff
Quarles had never been hired and the court had ordered his immediate hiring. 24 Therefore, the effect of this title VII remedy
would not constitute "retrospective" application of the Act because
the seniority system's post-Act effects perpetuated the original discrimination. The court in Quarles summarized the legislative intent: "It is . . . apparent that Congress did not intend to freeze an
entire generation of Negro employees into discriminatory patterns
25
that existed before the act."

Continuing the second part of its analysis, the court in Quarles
noted that the "plain language of the act condemns as an unfair
practice all racial discrimination affecting employment without
excluding present discriminationthat originated in seniority systems
devised before the effective date of the act."26 Thus, it determined
that neither the language nor the legislative history of the Act
proscribed the remedy of retroactive seniority in this and in similar
cases.
21. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
22. Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505, 516 (E.D. Va. 1968).
23. Reverse discrimination may be characterized as "accelerat[ing] the advancement of Negroes simply because of their race." Note, 80 HARV. L. REV., supra
note 16, at 1271-72.
24. See Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505, 516 (E.D. Va. 1968).
The distinction drawn by the Quarles court has been noted by other courts and observers as having a solid foundation in reason and legislative history. See, e.g.,
Gould, supra note 11, at 20; Note, 80 HARv. L. REV., supra note 16, at 1269. The
major concern evidenced during the debates on H.R. 7152 was abhorrence of reverse
discrimination. Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505, 516 (E.D. Va. 1968).
But, for example, in Quarles, and later in International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977), "Negro workers [did] not seek to wrench away the contractual rights which whites [had] already earned. They [were] attempting to acquire
rights of their own which could make the competition for better jobs more meaningful." Gould, supra note 11, at 21.
25. Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505, 516 (E.D. Va. 1968).
26. Id. at 515 (emphasis added).
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The third part of the court's analysis considered the effect
of section 703(h) on de facto discrimination. It stated that this section does not purport to bar all relief from discriminatory seniority systems, only from those "bona fide seniority [systems which]
. . . 'are not the result of an intention to discriminate.' "27 The
Quarles court held that a "departmental seniority system that has
its genesis in racial discrimination is not a bona fide seniority
system." 28 The court then indicated that the discrimination at issue
resulted from the employer's intentionally discriminatory hiring
and promotion practices. 29 This rendered the seniority system's
classifications " 'the result of an intention to discriminate,' "30 and
therefore outside the scope of the exemption to section 703(h).
In essence, the Quarles rule provides that seniority systems
which perpetuate pre-Act discrimination are not bona fide and
therefore not protected by section 703(h). 3l The court based its
ruling on several findings. First, it used a balancing test to determine that the seniority expectations of white employees must be
subjected to modification by the rights of minority employees to
equai economic opportunity.32 Second, the court recognized a distinction between granting minority employees full company seniority for the years employed and bumping white employees to give
minority employees jobs: 33 Only the latter is proscribed as a ret-

rospective application of the Act. 34 Finally, this exemption for
seniority systems is not available where a system preserves past
35
discrimination de facto, even if it is not de jure discriminatory.
Moreover, an original discriminatory intent by the employer ren27. Id. at 517 (quoting Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h)
(1970)). The company and the union had defended by asserting that discrimination
has resulted from a long-abolished employer policy of segregation and was therefore irremediable by title VII. "This point is crucial to the defendants' case. It
is based upon the proposition that the present consequences of past discrimina-

tion are outside the coverage of the act." Id. at 515. Judge Butzner rejected the defendants' argument. See id.
28. Id. at 517.
29. Id.
30. Id. (quoting Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970)).
31. Id. at 518. Justice Stewart summarized Quarles as "the view that § 703(h)
does not immunize seniority systems that perpetuate the effects of prior discrimination." International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 346 n.28
(1977).
32. See notes 15-20 supra and accompanying text.
33. See notes 21-26 supra and accompanying text.
34. See notes 27-30 supra and accompanying text.
35. Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505, 516-18 (E.D. Va. 1968).
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ders the seniority system the result of an intention to discriminate,
and thus not immunized by section 703(h).
THE Quarles PROGENY:
TREATMENT IN THE COURTS OF APPEALS

The courts of appeals, 3 6 following Quarles, amplified it with
independent reasoning. The following cases comprise a representative sampling of the circuits. The facts in each case are, for purposes of this inquiry, indistinguishable from those in Quarles.
In Robinson v. Lorillard Corp.,37 the Fourth Circuit broadened the Quarles interpretation of the "intent proviso" of section
703(h). 3 8 Robinson construed "intent to discriminate" to signify
merely that defendant union, accused of an unlawful employment
practice, "meant to do what [it] did." 39 Therefore, because no seniority system may properly be characterized as an "accident,"40 if it
causes discrimination, it constitutes intentional discrimination that is
not exempt within the meaning of section 703(h). 4 1 Thus, after
Robinson, a court was not required to find intent by the employer
42
affirmatively to discriminate and then to impute it to the union:
36. Gibson v. Local 40, Supercargoes & Checkers of the Int'l Longshoremen's
Union, 543 F.2d 1259 (9th Cir. 1976); Nance v. Union Carbide Corp., 540 F.2d 718
(4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 2671 (1977); Swint v. Pullman-Standard, 539
F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1976); Acha v. Beame, 531 F.2d 648 (2d Cir. 1976); EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1975), vacated, 97 S. Ct. 2668 (1977); Rogers
v. International Paper Co., 510 F.2d 1340 (8th Cir.), vacated, 423 U.S. 809 (1975);
United States v. N.L. Indus., Inc., 479 F.2d 354 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v.
Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 1971). For exhaustive lists of the cases
following the Quarles trend, see International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States,
431 U.S. 324, 378 n.2, 379 n.3, 380 n.4 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting); United States
v. IBEW Local 38, 428 F.2d 144 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 943 (1970).
37. 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971).
38. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
39. Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 796 (4th Cir. 1971) (quoting
Local 189, United Papermakers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980, 996 (5th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970)).
40. See id.
41. One commentator emphasizes the language of § 703(h) prohibiting classifications which result from an intention to discriminate:
[I]t should be urged that the result of a past discrimination continues into
the present and future, creating differences in classifications and rates of
pay. Such a result is present even though there may be no present intent to
discriminate. While such conduct in the past may not have been illegal at
that time, no one can deny its discriminatory purpose. The statute does not
say the system had to be illegal at the time it was set up; it merely makes
wrongful the results of an intent to discriminate.
Rachlin, supra note 15, at 480.
42. See Note, 80 HARV. L. REV., supra note 16, at 1267.
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The mere nonaccidental use of a seniority system for any purpose,
which has the effect of discriminating, constituted intentional discrimination by the union. Robinson is in accord with the Quarles
rule that, notwithstanding any statements in the legislative history

proscribing retrospective application of the title, "relief may be
granted to remedy 'present and continuing effects of past discrimi-

nation.' "43 The court inRobinson elaborated on the principle that
all employees are entitled to the "same expectations. '"4 4 It held that
the expectations of minorities are not to be sacrificed to fulfill the expectations of nonminorities.4 5 Rather, the court stated that where
minorities have lower expectations because of the past discrimination on the basis of race, they are entitled to have these expectations heightened, even at the expense of lowering the expectations
46
of nonminorities.
The Eighth Circuit, in United States v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. ,47 dealt with both the intent requirement in the language

of section 703(h) and with the legislative history of title VII, which
appear to favor a "status quo" approach 48 to existing seniority sys43. Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 795 (4th Cir. 1971) (quoting
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1230 (4th Cir. 1970), rev'd, 401 U.S. 424
(1971)).
44. Id. at 800. This doctrine has its origins in the common law rule that the
union is obliged to represent fairly all employees. Steele v. Louisiana & Nashville
R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944), cited in Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505,
518 (E.D. Va. 1968). This "duty of fair representation," Gould, supra note 11, at 5,
has been fortified and encouraged by title VII.
45. See Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 800 (4th Cir. 1971).
46. Id. Modification of the seniority expectations of one group to benefit
another is not without precedent. One example of such a policy has been articulated
by a commentator: "Congress, in the Selective Service Act, has made the veteran's
seniority statutory as well as contractual and has thus made an impact on the employment status of veterans and non-veterans alike." Gould, supra note 11, at 5 (citations
omitted).
47. 464 F.2d 301 (8th Cir. 1972).
48. The "status quo" approach is only one of three methods by which to balance the interests to determine seniority. The other two are the "rightful place" and
the "freedom now" methods. The status quo interpretation of title VII leaves intact
the seniority rights of white employees and leaves unrestored the forfeited seniority
of minority employees who transfer to a higher position. This results because conforming to the facially neutral seniority provision at issue does not "involve the direct application of a racial principle." Note, 80 HARV. L. REv., supra note 16, at 1268
(footnote omitted). Thus, minorities could transfer, but in so doing would lose all
seniority and become susceptible to discharge as last hired, first fired. See id. The
"rightful place" approach is the middle ground taken by Quarles: "[C]ontinued
maintenance of the relative competitive disadvantage imposed on Negroes by the
past operation of a discriminatory system violates Title VII." Id. In practical terms, a
remedy under this approach enables the minority discriminatee to "bid for openings
in 'white' jobs comparable to those held by whites of equal tenure, on the basis of
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tems. The court held that "[-w]here an employer's current policy
serves to perpetuate the effects of past discrimination, 'although
neutral on its face, it rejuvenates the past discrimination in both

fact and law regardless of present good faith.'

"a4

Thus, what was

past discrimination becomes present de jure and de facto discrimi-

nation and remedying this discrimination is not tantamount to applying the Act retroactively.
Other circuits5 0 have generally reiterated the views expressed
in Quarles and in the other cases mentioned above. The doctrine
was so widely accepted that the Fifth Circuit, in Johnson v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,51 discouraged further belaboring of the
point: "The principle of the illegality of a facially neutral seniority
system superimposed on a history of employment discrimination is
so well-settled that extended discussion is unnecessary. "52
In sum, the law pre-Tearnsters was as follows: Seniority systems which operated to lock-in past discrimination were not
exempted from title VII by section 703(h). These systems fell out-

side the scope of the exemption by virtue of their intentional
promulgation or by virtue of the employer's discriminatory hiring;

they were not considered bona fide because of the de facto discrimination which they fostered.
his full length of service with the employer, . . . without regard to the seniority
expectations of junior white employees." Id. (emphasis added). Viewed by most
pre-Teamsters courts and observers as both the correct interpretation of § 703(h) and

the most equitable balancing of interests, this approach enables the minority
employee to bid for future vacancies in higher departments on the basis of seniority
accumulated in the lower department. See, e.g., United States v. IBEW Local 38, 428
F.2d 144 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 943 (1970). Furthermore, upon transfer to
the preferred department, the discriminatee retains his accumulated seniority and
possesses bargaining rights junior only to those employees who had worked more
years for the company. A third approach is the "freedom now" method. If, under the
"rightful place" method of computing seniority, "a senior Negro would have priority
over a white worker currently holding a particular job if that job were unfilled, then
under 'freedom now' the Negro would be immediately entitled to it, even though
this would require the displacement of the white incumbent." Note, 80 HARv. L.
REV., supra note 16, at 1269. This approach has never gained great support, perhaps
because it is retroactive and thus contravenes congressional intent. In addition, this
"approach appears so radical and so abrupt as to foreclose any possibility of securing
voluntary, if gruding, compliance with the title's requirements." Id. See generally
id. at 1268-75 (thorough discussion of three approaches).
49. United States v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 464 F.2d 301, 307 (8th Cir. 1972) (quoting Marquez v. Omaha Dist. Sales Office, Ford Div. of Ford Motor Co., 440 F.2d
1157, 1160 (8th Cir. 1971)).
50. See note 36 supra.
51. 491 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1974).
52. Id. at 1373. To explain this conclusion, the court in Johnson listed some of
the court of appeals cases which had followed Quarles. Id. at 1373 n.27.
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In following the Quarles rule, many of the circuits relied upon
four recent Supreme Court cases. Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 53
dealt with intelligence tests as a condition of employment or promotion. The Court in Griggs found the tests illegal, notwithstanding their facial neutrality. The controlling consideration was that
using the tests "operate[s] to disqualify Negroes at a substantially
higher rate than white applicants." 54 For this reason, the circuits
cited Griggs as Supreme Court confirmation of Quarles in seniority cases. 55 As in Quarles, discrimination in Griggs locked the
minorities into less desirable positions. The congressional intent
behind title VII was found to be clear from the language of the
statute. 56 To effectuate the Act's broad remedial purpose, 57 the
Supreme Court refused to allow a myopic approach to the Act. 58

Instead, the date of title VII was not to be considered an unyielding barrier: The Court decided that where pre-Act practices caused
present restrictions or discriminatory handicaps for minorities, it
was contrary to the intent of Congress to ignore and exempt those
practices from liability. 59
Griggs also found that title VII prohibits "not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation." 60 Thus, it is the effect which determines liability, not the facial neutrality of the system or practice nor the date
of its promulgation. The courts of appeals had good cause, therefore, to consider the Griggs holding supportive of a broad remedial
application of the title.
In 1973, the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green61 restated this doctrine: "[Ilt is abundantly clear that Title
VII tolerates no racial discrimination, subtle or otherwise. "62 This
case dealt with a black activist who claimed that his firing was racially motivated. The Court viewed the case as an opportunity to
53. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
54. Id. at 426.
55. See, e.g., Sims v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 65, 489 F.2d 1023, 1026 (6th
Cir. 1973).
56. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429 (1971).

57. See id. at 429-30.
58. See id.; notes 128-131 infra and accompanying text.
59. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). The Court in Griggs
found that "Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation." Id. at 432 (emphasis in original).
60. Id. at 431.
61. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
62. Id. at 801.
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"clarify the standards governing the disposition of an action challenging employment discrimination." 6 3 The critical issue was, according to the Court, "the order and allocation of proof in a private,
64
non-class [Title VII] action."
The discriminatee in McDonnell Douglas was denied recovery
because of the "seriously disruptive act" which led to his discharge. 6 5 But the Court engaged in extensive discussion of the
theories involved in title VII claims. Citing Quarles and Griggs,
the Court emphasized that facial neutrality of an employment practice is not a bar to recovery. 66 Quarles, like McDonnell Douglas,
found a title VII violation in de facto discrimination by looking
beyond the form of the employment practice to the discriminatory
67
effect title VII was designed to elirhinate.
Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody6 8 dealt with both a seniority
system and an intelligence testing program. Although the Court
stressed the employment test and backpay issues, it quoted Griggs
in discussing the strong remedial purpose of title VII. 6 9 Albemarle
held that, given a finding of unlawful discrimination, "backpay
should be denied only for reasons which, if applied generally,
would not frustrate the central statutory purposes of making per70
sons whole for injuries suffered through past discrimination."
Quoting Griggs, the Court also held that employers' "' good intent
or absence of discriminatory intent' " is irrelevant because the dis71
criminatory consequence, not the motive behind it, controls.
The Court in Albemarle made several statements concerning
the "prophylactic," 72 "make whole 73 nature and purpose of the
title. Moreover, the federal courts 74 found apparent support for
their adoption of Quarles in this language in Albemarle.75 Looking
63. Id. at 798.
64. Id. at 800.

65. Id. at 806.
66. See id. at 800-06.
67. See notes 27-30 supra and accompanying text.
68. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
69. Id. at 417.
70. Id. at 421.
71. Id. at 422-23 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971)).
72. Id. at 417.
73. Id. at 418. The Court in Albemarle asserted: "It is .. .the purpose of Title
VII to make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment
discrimination." Id.
74. See, e.g., Stryker v. Register Publishing Co., 423 F. Supp. 476 (D. Conn.
1976); EEOC v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 419 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
75. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975).
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beyond the date of the Act, they fashioned a remedy consistent
with the broad remedial spirit of the title.
76
Finally, in 1976, in Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co.,
the Court issued yet another "final word" 77 on section 703(h). This

case, like Quarles and Teamsters, concerned a seniority system.
The Court in Franks declared that section 703(h) "delineates which

employment practices are illegal and thereby prohibited and which
are not. Section 703(h) certainly does not expressly purport to qualify or proscribe relief otherwise appropriate . ..."78 The Court
further held that awarding seniority retroactive to the date of the
individual job application comports with title VII's "make whole"
purpose. 79 Therefore, the only purpose in the enactment of this
section was to clarify the balance of interests behind the Act.8 0 As a

restatement of the Act's compromise between "status quo" and
"freedom now," section 703(h) does not limit section 703(c)'s pro-

hibition of union discrimination. 81 Intended as a reassurance that
82
the Act would not involve bumping white incumbent employees,
it refrained from granting a blanket exemption 83 and only clarified
84
the Act's subscription to the "rightful place" compromise.

Teamsters:

HISTORY AND ANALYSIS

Writing for a seven-member majority,8 5 Justice Stewart dis76. 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
77. EEOC v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 419 F. Supp. 1022, 1048 (E.D. Pa.
1976) (calling Franks "final word" on issue). Prior to Franks, Griggs had been called

the "last word on this issue" of seniority systems locking minorities into lower positions. See United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972).
78. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 758 (1976) (footnotes omitted).
79. Id. at 763. The Court's analysis of the merely explanatory nature of § 703(h)
conforms with the remarks of Senator Hubert H. Humphrey during the debate on
H.R. 7152 that the section was intended only to clarify, not restrict, the application of
other title VII provisions. 110 CONG. REC. 12,721-23 (1964).
80. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 758-62 (1976).
81. Id. at 758.
82. Note, 80 HARV. L. REv., supra note 16, at 1271.
83. Rachlin, supra note 15, at 473.
84. Rains, Title VII v. Seniority Based Layoffs: A Question of Who Goes First,
4 HOFSTRA L. Rv. 49, 52 & n.13 (1975); Note, 80 HARV.L. REV., supra note 16, at
1272-73.
85. Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist, and
Stevens joined in Justice Stewart's opinion. International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 327 (1977). Justice Marshall filed an opinion in which
Justice Brennan joined, concurring in the part of the majority opinion dealing with
employer discrimination and dissenting in the part dealing with seniority systems.
Id. at 377 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol6/iss3/4

12

1978]

Carton: The Seniority System Exemption in Title VII: International Brothe
SENIORITY SYSTEM EXEMPTION

agreed with the courts' of appeals understanding of the issue. In

InternationalBrotherhood of Team-sters v. United States,8 6 he flatly
rejected the arguments which had predominated virtually unchallenged for nearly ten years.
The District Court
87
Teamisters began as two separate federal government actions,
one against the employer, T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc., a nationwide carrier of motor freight, and the second against the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, the union representing a large number

of the company's employees. The Government 88 alleged that the
company had followed a pattern and practice of discrimination in
violation of title VII. 8 9 The union was subsequently joined as a

defendant because of the allegedly discriminatory effects of its
seniority system, and the two actions were consolidated for trial in
the District Court for the Northern District of Texas.
The alleged violation of section 703(c) of title VII by the union

was based on the discriminatory effects which resulted de facto
from the application of the seniority system incorporated into the
collective bargaining agreement. The system provided for three
major distinct bargaining units: line drivers, also known as overthe-road (OTR) long-distance drivers; servicemen; and city operators, composed of dockmen, hostlers, and city drivers. The OTR
drivers had the highest paying, most desirable positions. 90
The system, operating on the basis of departmental rather
than company-wide seniority, had a promotion-deterrent effect
86. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
87. Id. at 328-29.

88. Section 705 of title VII created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and originally endowed it with enforcement powers. See Civil
Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 705, 78 Stat. 241 (current version at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1970 & Supp. V 1975)). The original bill of title VII was amended
to transfer the authority to bring a civil suit for alleged violations from the Commission to the discriminatee. Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM.

L. REv. 431, 436-37 (1966). However, notwithstanding that the enforcement powers
for this type of suit were transferred to the EEOC from the Attorney General after
the suit's commencement, Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 707(c), 78
Stat. 241 (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (1970 & Supp. V 1975)), the United
States was retained as a party in this case. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
United States, 431 U.S. 324, 328 n.1 (1977).
89. The applicable section of the title was § 703(a), which states in part: "It
shall be an unlawful practice for an employer . . . to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual ... because of such individual's race .... " Civil Rights Act
of 1964, § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
90. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 329 (1977).
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similar to that in Quarles.9 ' The Government sought a general injunction 92 and specific "make whole" relief for all individual discriminatees. 93 The latter remedy would afford the discriminatees
the opportunity to transfer to OTR positions with full company
seniority. 94 The Government alleged that the affected class of individual discriminatees, those entitled to some form of individual
relief, consisted of all minorities who had been hired for city opera95
tions or servicemen positions instead of OTR positions.
The union argued that the system was bona fide in light of its
"history, intent, application, and all of the circumstances under
which it was created and is maintained." 96 The union further alleged that any discriminatory effects of the system were "not the
result of an intention to discriminate,- 97 and that therefore the
system was protected by section 703(h) and exempt from liability. 98
The district court in Teamsters9 9 found that the seniority system violated title VII because it restricted minority groups' mobility into and within the company.100 Further violation by the
union was enjoined. 101
The district court accepted the Government's definition of "affected class,' 10 2 and declared the class members, "whether hired
before or after the effective date of Title VII, . . entitled to preference over all other applicants with respect to consideration for
future vacancies in line-driver jobs."103 While this falls short of a
"freedom now" approach in that it only concerns future vacancies
91.
92.

See text accompanying notes 10 & 11 supra.
The injunctive relief sought would generally proscribe further title viola-

tions by the union and employer. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States,
431 U.S. 324, 330 (1977).

93. Id.
94.

Id.

95. Id. at 331; see id. at 332 n.6.
96. Id. at 345.
97. 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(h) (1970) (originally enacted as Civil Rights Act of 1961,
Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703(h), 78 Stat. 241).
98. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 345 (1977).
99. United States v. T.I.M.E.-DC, Inc., 6 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 690 (N.D. Tex.
1974), remanded, 517 F.2d 299 (5th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, 431 U.S. 324
(1977).
100. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 331 (1977).
101. United States v. T.I.M.E.-DC, Inc., 6 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 690, 694 (N.D.
Tex. 1974), remanded, 517 F.2d 299 (5th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, 431 U.S.
324 (1977).
102. Id.
103. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 331 (1977)
(footnote omitted) (discussing district court holding).
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and does not bump workers, it ventures slightly beyond the "rightful place" doctrine in that the bargaining power of the discriminatees is to become superior in many instances to that of
white employees with equal seniority. This results from the preference created by the district court for members of the affected class.
This class was further divided into three subclasses on the
basis of degree of injury demonstrated. 10 4 No retroactive seniority
predating the Act was granted to any subclass. 10 5 In addition, the
district court issued a further limitation on its otherwise extensive
relief. The right of the members of the affected class to bid for
vacancies was to be subject to the prior recall rights of laid-off
line-drivers, which under the collective bargaining agreements
then in effect extended for three years. 10 6 Thus, while providing
relief for the discriminatees, the district court limited this relief by
balancing the rights of the victims against those of the incumbent
white employees.
The Court of Appeals
The decision of the district court was appealed by the Government to the Fifth Circuit. 10 7 The court of appeals, while agreeing with the district court's conclusions,' 0 8 extended the lower
court's ruling by eliminating the restrictions' 0 9 on the relief ordered
by the district court. All members of what the Government defined
as the affected class were held entitled to bid for future OTR vacancies on the basis of their full company seniority, even if it predated the effective date of the title. 110 The court of appeals reasoned
104.

United States v. T.I.M.E.-DC, Inc., 6 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 690, 694-95

(N.D. Tex. 1974), remanded, 517 F.2d 299 (5th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded,
431 U.S. 324 (1977). Victims who had suffered severe injury were offered the opportunity to fill line-driver jobs with competitive seniority dating back to July 2, 1965,
the effective date of title VII. Id. Victims in the second subclass, those who were
only likely harmed but had not provided evidence of specific injury, were also given
the opportunity to fill line-driver jobs, but their awarded retroactive seniority was to
date back only to 1971 when the Government first commenced suit. Id. at 695. Finally, those in the third subclass, who were not shown to be harmed at all, were to
be granted no retroactive seniority, but would be preferred for vacancies behind only
the two higher subclasses. Id.
105. See id. at 694-95.
106. Id. at 704.
107. United States v. T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc., 517 F.2d 299 (5th Cir. 1975), vacated
and remanded, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
108. See id. at 317.
109. See id. at 319.
110. Id. at 319-21. This holding differed from the remedy ordered below in
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that more limited relief placed unnecessary emphasis on the expectations of the incumbent white employees.
The Supreme Court
The union's petition for certiorari was granted by the Supreme
Court "to consider the significant questions presented under the
Civil Rights Act of 1964."'11 The issue required a reexamination of
the Quarles rule which, Justice Stewart conceded, "has much support";1 1 2 that is, whether "Title VII prohibits those applications of
a seniority system that perpetuate the effects on incumbent
employees of prior discriminatory job assignments."1 1 3
The Supreme Court affirmed the finding of discrimination in a
"continued, built-in disadvantage"' 1 4 resulting from the seniority
system:
An example would be a Negro who was qualified to be a line
driver in 1958 but vbo, because of his race, was assigned instead
a job as a city driver, and is allowed to become a line driver only
in 1971. Because he loses his competitive seniority when he
transfers jobs, he is forever junior to white line drivers hired
between 1958 and 1970. The whites, rather than the Negro, will
henceforth enjoy the preferable runs and the greater protection
against layoff. Although the original discrimination occurred in
1958-before the effective date of Title VII-the seniority system operates to carry the effects of the earlier discrimination into
the present."

5

However, by virtue of the language of section 703(h), and its
6
legislative history, Justice Stewart found immunity for the union."
The Court first considered potential precedent. The earlier Suthree ways: First, it eliminated the three subclassifications which had limited the
ability to bid for vacancies with full company seniority to only those most severely
injured; second, the retroactive seniority offered was no longer limited to July 2,
1965; and third, subjecting the preferred status of the discriminatees to the rights of
the laid-off nonminorities was removed as an undue impediment on the exercise of
title VII rights. Id. at 324.
111. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 425 U.S. 990 (1976).
112. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 334 (1977)
(citation omitted).
113. Id. at 346. Justice Stewart, who wrote for the majority in Teamsters, also
wrote for the majority in Albemarle Paper Co.v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975), which,
several courts of appeals found, supported the Quarles trend. See notes 68-75 supra
and accompanying text.
114. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 344 (1977).
115. Id. at 344 n.27.
116. Id. at 348-56.
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preme Court cases which the discriminatees used to support their
position were ruled inapplicable, and the Quarles trend was not
117
even deemed persuasive.
The Supreme Court in Teamsters rejected Griggs v. Duke
Power Co. 11s as inapposite, 119 distinguishing it because Griggs involved an employment test and Teamsters involved a seniority system. 120 Justice Stewart relied on the same legislative history which
Quarles and its progeny had found supportive of their rulings.
Yet, notwithstanding the factual distinction, the discriminatees had
good cause to rely on Griggs;121 under Griggs, the locking-in effect
of seniority systems would be a violation because it perpetuates
past discrimination although its provisions apply "equally" to whites
and blacks.122 Justice Stewart, however, found that facial neutrality
rendered the seniority system bona fide in Teamsters. In analyzing
Griggs and limiting it to its facts, Justice Stewart, in effect, failed
to apply the spirit of that case and its interpretation of the purpose
of title VII. Refusing to acknowledge the propriety of a narrower
interpretation of section 703(h), he reasoned that the very thrust of
this section was aimed at immunizing facially neutral systems like
the one in Teamsters.
117. Id. at 346 n.28. Although Justice Stewart, in stating what is no longer the
law, relegated the Quarles line of cases to a perfunctory footnote, the Quarles interpretation and its ensuing trend should not be ignored. The Quarles line proves
relevant in analyzing potential weaknesses in the Teamsters opinion. The number of
courts and legal scholars adhering to the Quarles approach and the clarity of its
reasoning erode some of Justice Stewart's arguments.
118. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See notes 53-60 supra and accompanying text.
119. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 349
(1977).
120. See id. The majority in Teamsters found § 703(h) a bar to relief under
seniority systems. Yet both seniority systems and employment tests are within the
purview of § 703(h): The Court in Griggs had not found this section a bar to relief.
See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The practical effect of locking in
minorities by seniority systems and by intelligence tests is similar, if not indistinguishable. Moreover, both practices were deemed worthy of specific recognition and
limited exemption in the Act. Nevertheless, the Court in Griggs limited the § 703(h)
exemption to cases where past discrimination would not be perpetuated. See id. at
430.
121. See notes 53-60 supra and accompanying text.
122. The Supreme Court in Griggs even used language from the Quarles opinion. In phrasing strongly reminiscent of the Quarles rule, Griggs held that "under
the Act, practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in
terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of
prior discriminatory employment practices." Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424, 430 (1971). See also Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505, 516 (E.D.

Va. 1968).
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Turning next to Franks v. Bowman TransportationCo.,1 23 the
Court in Teamsters noted that the discrimination in Franks consisted of a post-Act refusal to hire, as distinguished from the preAct discrimination in Teamsters.12 4 Apparently relying upon this
25
factual distinction, Justice Stewart rejected Franks as precedent.1
However, the discriminatees in Teamsters had justifiably found
Franks supportive. The Court in Franks stated:
Certainly there is no argument that the award of retroactive
seniority to the victims of hiring discrimination in any way deprives other employees of indefeasibly vested rights conferred by
the employment contract. This Court has long held that
employee expectations arising from a seniority system agreement
may be modified by statutes furthering a strong public policy
6
interest.12
The Court further declared that the "end of ameliorating the
effects of past racial discrimination is a national policy objective of
the highest priority." 2 7 The Court in Teamsters once again ignored
the spirit of an earlier case, relying upon formalistic distinctions.
The issue in Teamsters, its predecessors, and its progeny is
one of chronology and of the direction in which judges hearing title
VII cases may look.128 A statement in the legislative history of title
VII that the title was to have only prospective effect 12 9 is frequently quoted. But such language has a tendency to be vague' 30
and the question remains: How far into the past can courts look to
rectify current discrimination?
The seniority system is unique in that it joins the past, present, and future, and therefore deserves special treatment. Originating when the employer may have discriminated in hiring or
promotion, the system has a present effect of perpetuating prior
123. 424 U.S. 747 (1976). See notes 76-84 supra and accompanying text.
124. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 346 (1977).
125. See id. at 346-47. The Court in Teamsters conceded that, under Franks,
any victim of post-Act discrimination under the seniority system was entitled to re-

lief, notwithstanding § 703(h). Victims of pre-Act discrimination which has been preserved by the seniority system were not, according to Justice Stewart, afforded a
remedy by virtue of Franks. Id.
126. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 778 (1976) (footnote omitted).
127. Id. at 779.
128. Gould, supra note 11, at 21-23.
129. Interpretative Memorandum, supra note 15, at 7213.
130. Note, 80 HARv. L. REv., supra note 16, at 1266.
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abuses by retaining the employer's discrimination de facto. 131 Concepts of time, therefore, appear to require a measure of elasticity.
The Supreme Court in Teamsters, however, ignored such considerations.
Although Justice Stewart discussed the language of Albemarle, 132 McDonnell Douglas,133 Franks,13 4 and Griggs,'135 he did
not apply these cases to Teamsters. While the Court acknowledged
that the thrust of these cases, especially Griggs,136 seemed to mandate relief in Teamsters, it maintained that section 703(h) was designed to immunize seniority systems and that effect must be given
37
to that congressional intent.1
Justice Stewart next considered the legislative history of title
VII. He noted that the Department of Justice and the proponents
of title VII had stated that existing seniority rights were not to be
affected by the title. 138 Justice Stewart quoted a memorandum by
Senators Clark and Case to the effect that an employer "would not
be obliged-or indeed, pennitted-to fire whites in order to hire
Negroes, or to prefer Negroes for future vacancies, or, once Negroes are hired, to give them special seniority rights at the expense
of the white workers hired earlier.' 139 Justice Stewart found these
statements "authoritative indicators of the . . . purpose"'140 of section 703(h), although they did not refer to that section. The purpose of the section, according to Justice Stewart, was to placate the
title's detractors and to reassure the doubtful that the status quo,
albeit discriminatory, would not be disturbed.' 4 1 However, the
Quarles line of cases had found that full company seniority, retroactive either to the date of employment or to the date of the Act,
131. Vaas, supra note 88, at 449.
132. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 364 (1977).
133. Id. at 348.
134. Id. at 346-47.
135. Id. at 349.
136. Id.
137. See id. at 349-52.
138. Id. at 350.
139. Id. at 350-51 (quoting Interpretative Memorandum, supra note 15, at 7213)
(footnote omitted). Senators Clark and Case were the "bipartisan captains" responsible for title VII during the Senate debate. Bipartisan captains were selected for each
title of the Civil Rights Act by the leading proponents of the Act of both parties.
They were responsible for explaining their title in detail, defending it, and leading
discussion on it. Id. at 351 n.35.
140. Id. at 352.
141. Id.
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could be effected without violating the Clark-Case memorandum or
other statements in the legislative history. Incumbent white
employees were not to be fired by giving minorities the use of
142
their full company seniority for bargaining and bidding purposes;
"white workers hired earlier"143 than black workers were still to
have greater seniority rights; and finally, neither race was to be
preferred for future vacancies. 144 Rather, vacancies were to be
filled on a neutral basis by virtue of company seniority. Justice
Stewart's opinion, however, made no mention of the availability of
this remedy.
Senator Humphrey had stated that section 703(h) "merely
clarifies [title VII's] present intent and effect.' 4 5 Justice Stewart
found it
inconcpivable that section 703(h), as part of a compromise bill,
was inended to vitiate the earlier representations of the Act's
supporiers by increasing Title ViI's impact on seniority systems
....[T]he unmistakable purpose of section 703(h) was to make
clear that the routine application of a bona fide seniority system
would not be unlawful under Title VII. 146

Thus, Justice Stewart considered the import of the legislative
history a strong mandate against invading the existing seniority systems. In so finding, however, he relied on the same statements of
intent as those upon which the overwhelming majority of the federal courts had relied in reaching the opposite conclusion. This difference in opinion was rooted in Justice Stewart's overly broad
interpretation of the sweeping legislative commentary. This is in
contrast to the Quarles line which read these statements in conjunction with the purpose of title VII: to effect a delicate balance of
interests. Justice Stewart found unpersuasive the opinions of the
many courts and commentators which had balanced white employees' seniority expectations against the rights of the discriminatees
and had found the discriminatees' rights controlling.
Turning to the language of the section,1 4 7 Justice Stewart re-

jected the Quarles reasoning to the effect that any system which
perpetuates past discrimination cannot be bona fide. The Court in
142.

143.
144.
145.
v. United
146.
147.

See note 139 supra and accompanying text.

See id.
See id.
110 CONG. REc. 12,723 (1964), quoted in International Bhd. of Teamsters
States, 431 U.S. 324, 352 (1977). See note 79 supra.
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 352 (1977).
See id. at 353.
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Teamsters relied on two factors: the rights and expectations of
white employees 148 and the application of the system to whites and
minorities alike. 149 However, the Court viewed section 703(h) as
justification for ignoring statements in Griggs that "practices . . .
neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot
be maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior
discriminatory employment practices." 1 5 0 Griggs also proscribed
practices "that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.''5
This same interpretation, barring de facto discrimination, was repeated in Albennarle Paper Co. v. Moody 152 and in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green.153 Similarly, although the Court in Franks
v. Bowman TransportationCo.154 had rejected the contention that
white employees' expectations are controlling, 155 section 703(h) was
offered as the only necessary barrier to adhering to any of the title
VII precedents.
Thus, the Court held: "Those employees who suffered only
pre-Act discrimination are not entitled to relief, and no person may
be given retroactive seniority to a date earlier than the effective
date of the Act."' 156 Therefore, as a result of the Teamsters holding,
status quo discrimination resulting de facto from seniority systems
will remain intact.
The Dissent
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, dissented from
the majority's interpretation of section 703(h). 157 Justice Marshall
first noted the staggering quantity of support for the Quarles view
which Justice Stewart had summarily dismissed:
Without a single dissent, six Courts of Appeals have so held in
over 30 cases, and two other Courts of Appeals have indicated
their agreement, also without dissent. In an unbroken line of
cases, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has
148. Id.
149. Id. at 354-55.
150. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971). See note 122 supra
and accompanying text.
151. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
152. 422 U.S. 405 (1975). See note 71 supra and accompanying text.
153. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See note 67 supra and accompanying text.
154. 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
155. See note 126 supra and accompanying text.
156. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 356-57
(1977).
157. See id. at 377 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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reached the same conclusion. And the overwhelming weight of
scholarly opinion is in accord.' 58
The dissent also noted that exemptions are traditionally given
narrow interpretations:
Section 703(h) carves out an exemption from these broad prohibitions of Title VII. Accordingly, under longstanding principles
of statutory construction, the Act should 'be given a liberal interpretation . . . [and] exemptions from its sweep should be nar' 59
rowed and limited to effect the remedy intended.

Following the reasoning of Quarles, Justice Marshall found
that the legislative history supported his contentions.' 6 0 He noted
the distinction 1 6 ' between bumping to favor minorities, which was
intended to be prohibited,' 62 and granting equal bidding rights
16 3
based on years of company employment.
In addition to finding support in the Quarles line of cases and
in the earlier Supreme Court cases, the Teamsters dissent found
further evidence contrary to the majority's finding that "the Congress that enacted Title VII ...

agreed to postpone for one genera-

tion the achievement of economic equality."'164 According to the
dissent, the majority ignored the Equal Employment Opportunity
16 5 JusCommission's (EEOC) adherence to the Quarles approach.
tice Marshall cautioned: "Before I would sweep aside the EEOC's
consistent interpretation of the statute it administers, I would require 'compelling indications that it is wrong.' "166
The dissent also found that the enactment in 1972 of the Equal
16 7
Employment Opportunity Act (the EEOA), amending title VII,
derogated the majority's opinion. The dissent considered this Act
an extension and reaffirmation of the broad remedial powers of title
158. Id. at 378-80 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
159. Id. at 381 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Piedmont & N.R.R. Co. v.
ICC, 286 U.S. 299, 311-12 (1932)) (citations omitted).
160. See id. at 382-86 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
161. Id. at 384-87 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
162. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 389 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 388 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
165. See id. at 390 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 391 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co.,
414 U.S. 86, 94-95 (1973) (quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,
381 (1969))).
167. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat.
103 (amending 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 20OO0e-15 (1970)).
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VII and a tacit approval of the Quarles progenry;' 68 title VII and the
Quarles progeny were cited along with several supportive law re1 69
view articles in the Senate and House reports on the EEOA.
"[B]oth the Senate and House reports expressed approval of the
'perpetuation principle' as applied to seniority systems .
"170 Justice Marshall found this citation in the legislative history determinative because of the canon that " 'when several acts of Congress
are passed touching the same subject matter, subsequent legislation may be considered to assist in the interpretation of prior legislation upon the same subject.' "171 However, these arguments
were not even considered by the majority: The majority made no
attempt to refute the dissent's assertion that both developments
were determinative.
DEVELOPMENTS AFTER

Teamsters

The Teamsters rule may be viewed as the antithesis of
Quarles: Seniority systems which perpetuate past discrimination
are bona fide, and within the purview of section 703(h), and are
therefore immune from what would otherwise constitute a title VII
violation. How greatly this will modify title VII law is best determined by examining several post-Teamsters developments.
Less than two months after Teamsters, the EEOC issued an
Interpretive Memorandum. 72 to minimize Teamsters's potential effect. Eleanor Holmes Norton, Chairwoman of this Commission, introduced the memorandum by stating the Agency's determination
to read the case in light of "the standard rule that exceptions to a
remedial statute must be interpreted narrowly."1 73 This adopts the
approach of the Teamsters dissent.' 74
168. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 391
(1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
169. S.REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 n.1 (1971); H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. 8 n.2, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEwS 2137, 2144
n.2.
170. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 391 (1977)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
171. Id. at 393 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Tiger v. Western Inv. Co., 221
U.S. 286, 309 (1911)).
172. EEOC Interpretive Memorandum No. N-915 (July 14, 1977), EEOC
COMPL. MAN. (CCH) 6500 (1977). The Teamsters decision was handed down on
May 31, 1977; the EEOC Interpretive Memorandum was issued July 14, 1977.
173. SPOKESwOmrAN, August 15, 1977, at 5.
174. See note 159 supra and accompanying text.
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The memorandum 175 stated that a seniority system will be ad76
judged bona fide only if it was instituted before July 2, 1965,
and if the "evidence shows that there was no discriminatory intent
in the genesis or maintenance of the system." 177 Thus, the continuation of a system whose founding or maintenance involves discriminatory intent constitutes a violation. The intent requirement therefore is fulfilled by a present violation, rather than by a pre-Act
creation of the system or pre-Act discrimination in hiring.
The heart of the memorandum is found in its guidelines for
defining discriminatory intent: "Where unions or units were previously segregated, . . . [w]hen a union seniority system is in effect

and the employer or union is made aware that it is locking in
minorities or females, discriminatory intent will be inferred if the
system is maintained or renegotiated .
"...-178
For example, if the
system is maintained after any grievances 179 or EEOC charges are
filed against the union or employer, "discriminatory intent will be
inferred,"' 180 thus rendering section 703(h) immunity inapplicable.
Instead of requiring a showing of active discrimination on the part
of the employer in hiring or promotion or of the union in creating
the seniority system, usually predating the Act, a continuing passive use of the system will remove it from the protection of section
703(h).1 8 1
Representative Newton Steers, Jr., of Maryland, however, is
not convinced that any interpretation of Teamsters will rectify the
handicapping effect of section 703(h) on the aims of title VII. Acting presumably on the Court's statement that "[w]ere it not for
section 703(h), the seniority system in this case would seem to fall
under the Griggs rationale,"'182 he introduced legislation to amend
section 703(h) to outlaw seniority systems that perpetuate the effects of past discrimination. 183
175. See EEOC Interpretive Memorandum No. N-015 (July 14, 1977), EEOC
COMPL. MAN. (CCH) T 6500 (1977).

176. Id. at 5003.
177. Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
178. Id. at 5004.

179. Id.
180. Id.
181. This approach comports with the prediction of the Teamster's dissent that
the case need not bar relief customarily given in cases like Quarles and its progeny.
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 377 n.1 (1977)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 349.
183. See 123 CONG. REC. E4361 (daily ed. July 12, 1977).
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In the months following Teamsters, the Supreme Court has
continued to rely on section 703(h) to refuse to examine discrimination which predates the Act. United Airlines, Inc. v. Evans,' 8 4 a
sex-based discrimination case, is one such example. Plaintiff Evans
was fired in 1968 for getting married; the employer's policy authorizing the dismissal for her marriage was subsequently invalidated. 18 5 When United Airlines rehired her in 1972, they refused
to give her retroactive seniority. 18 6 While the Court acknowledged
that the seniority system was giving "present effect to a past act of
discrimination,"' 18 7 it ruled that this past act was rendered "lawfur'
by the tolling of the time limitation18 8 on actions brought under
the Act. Therefore, Evans's claim five years after the firing was not
"timely."1' 8 9 In Evans, the Quarles trend was again contravened by
the Supreme Court's avoidance of the remedial purpose of title VII.
While de facto discrimination operated in Teamsters and in Evans
to handicap the very victims title VII is aimed to protect, the Supreme Court used the narrow exemption of section 703(h) to
immunize the discriminating party and to allow continuing violations
of the title.
The Court found Franks'90 relevant only to remedial issues
and therefore not controlling, since Evans contained no remedy
issue.1 9 1 Although Franks had held that section 703(h) does not bar
1 92
an award of retroactive seniority after a violation is shown,
Evans found no violation subsequent to the 1972 rehiring.' 9 3 Evans
declared that as long as the post-1972 use of the seniority system
was not intentionally discriminatory, it was bona fide and protected
1 94
by section 703(h).
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, again dissented
in Evans for reasons similar to those espoused in his Teamsters dis184. 431 U.S. 553 (1977). This case was decided on the same day as Teamsters.
185. Id. at 554.
186. Id. at 555.
187. Id. at 558.

188. Id. at 555 nn.3 & 4. The claim had to be brought within 90 days of the
violation. Plaintiff's claim was governed by the 90-day requirement of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, § 706(d), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(d) (1970), which was expanded by
the 1972 amendments to 180 days, Act of Mar. 24, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 4(a),
86 Stat. 103.
189. United Airlines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 558 (1977).
190. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976).
191. United Airlines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 558-59 (1977).
192. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 761-62 (1976).
193. United Airlines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 559 (1977).
194. Id.
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sent. 195 Justice Marshall's first point was that, notwithstanding the
ostensibly neutral or unintentional application of the system, if
Evans had been male, she would not have been fired, and would
have retained the seniority which had accrued prior to 1972.196 The
second point put forth was that the 1972 refusal to give her retroactive seniority was a present and continuing violation' 97 because it
placed her at a continuous bargaining disadvantage 9 8 which she
would not have suffered had she been male. This resembles the approach taken in the EEOC Interpretative Memorandum.1 99
The same reasoning applies to the minority employees in
Teamsters. Had they been white, they would have been hired as
OTR drivers rather than as city drivers or servicemen. Their current seniority, therefore, would date back to the onset of their
20 0
company employment.
CONCLUSION

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted to eradicate discrimination in private employment. Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc. ,201 interpreted a provision in this title to comport with the
general purpose of the Act and to infuse meaning into its ambiguous
terminology. The rule of Quarles was accepted as logically persuasive by most federal courts and legal commentators. Yet the Supreme Court in Teamsters rejected the Quarles rule as an incorrect
20 2
interpretation of that provision of the title.
The effect Teamsters will have on title VII is uncertain because
of the EEOC's limiting memorandum. 20 3 The Teamsters rule, if
195. See id. at 560 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
196. See id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
197. See id. at 561 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
198. See id. at 561-62 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
199. Id. at 562 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See text accompanying note 177 supra.
200. See text accompanying note 115 supra.
201. 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
202. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 346 n.2 8
(1977).
203. See notes 172-181 supra and accompanying text. The Fourth Circuit recently indicated some of the changes, or lack of them, wrought by Teamsters. In
Younger v. Glamorgan Pipe & Foundry Co., No. 76-2278 (4th Cir. Sept. 23, 1977),
the court of appeals remanded this seniority case to the district court to reconsider its
decision in light of Franks and Teamsters. While the following quotation from the
decision hints at a dramatic change in title VII law because of Teamsters, a close
reading of its last line indicates that the change wrought may be only superficial:
To the extent that it relied on Glamorgan's seniority system as perpetuating
pre-Act employment discrimination, the district court should give close at-
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strictly applied, will deprive minorities of the full economic opportunities ostensibly afforded them by title VII. However, lower
courts may be loath to abandon the long-accepted Quarles doctrine
and embrace wholeheartedly the Teamsters rule. Instead, if they
circumvent Teamsters's full import, the case may evolve into nothing more crucial than a footnote in title VII law.
Sharon F. Carton

tention to Teamsters. To the extent that it relied on Glamorgan's seniority
system as perpetuating post-Act employment discrimination, the district
court should give close attention to [Franks v.] Bowman. We call attention
to the fact that Bowman and Teamsters both appear to require a finding of
initial discrimination in hiring as the premise upon which the operation of
a seniority system may be held to be in violation of Title VII.
Id., slip op. at 6-7 (emphasis added). This appears to be a loose reading of Teamsters,
if not a direct misconstruction. Teamsters found the application of a neutral seniority
system nondiscriminatory, notwithstanding initial employer discrimination in hiring.
Thus, as the dissent in Teamsters indicated, cases like Quarles might be decided
similarly today, despite the broad language of Teamsters. See International Bhd.
of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 379 n.3 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
See also id. at 346 n.28. In refraining from directly overruling Quarles, the majority
in Teamsters stated the holding in Quarles quite narrowly. Justice Stewart found the
Quarles line potentially distinguishable based on the finding in those cases of a
"genesis in racial discrimination." Id. at 352-56.
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